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19 The Constitution and Congressional Committees: 1971-2000
Keith E. Whittington, Neal Devins, and Hutch Hicken

The United States Congress delegates a significant portion of its legislative work
to its committees. Even though the power and independence of committees has
varied over time,' the observation of a young Woodrow Wilson in the late nineteenth
century remains largely true today: "The House sits, not for serious discussion, but
to sanction the conclusions of its Committees as rapidly as possible. It legislates in
its committee-rooms; ... so that it is not far from the truth to say that Congress in
session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms
is Congress at work." Congress both "deliberates and legislates" in committee.
C ongressional committees are nonetheless largely uncharted territory for constitutional scholars. The new scholarly interest in extrajudicial constitutional interpretation largely ignores the congressional committee system generally and its
routine work. When it focuses on the legislature at all, this scholarship limits its
sights to floor debates or committee activities of extraordinary interest, such as
the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination of Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court. But, if committees are the primary sites in which Congress both
deliberates and legislates, an adequate picture of congressional efforts to interpret
and implement the Constitution will have to take into account the normal work of
the committees.
Committee hearings provide a useful window into congressional deliberation.
Hearings do not provide direct access to the investigation and negotiation that
ultimately produces legislative action. But as staged events for public consumption, hearings do provide useful information. They are an important platform for
members of Congress to win public notice, shape public opinion, and advance
favored causes. Committee hearings are an important vehicle by which legislators
seek to build a public record, communicating with legislative colleagues, executive
branch officials, interested activists, and the general public. In hearings, legislators put political relationships and concerns on display and establish warrants of
authority for legislative action. They serve as "rituals for legitimizing decisions," and
it is precisely in those rituals of legitimization that we may expect the Constitution
to be invoked. '
See infra notes 14-15 (discussing how changes in the balance of power between party leaders and
committee chairs impacts on congressional consideration of constitutional issues).
Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (New York: Meridian Books, 1956) at 69, 62.
John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) at 23.
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This chapter takes a bird 's- eye view of congressional committee hearings raising
constitutional issues. It maps the patterns of such hearing activity in Congress
during the last three decades of the twentieth century. As such, it does not delve into
what happens inside individual hearings or consider the quality of congressional
deliberation on constitutional matters. Such tasks remain for the future. Instead,
this chapter examines the quantity and location of constitutional discourse within
Congress and the basic structure of constitutional deliberation in Congress, and it
seeks to identify the determinants of legislative attention to constitutional subjects.
Such a perspective on congressional engagement with the Constitution reveals
a surprising consistency in congressional hearing activity. While individual issues
come and go and individual hearings respond to transitory and idiosyncratic forces,
Congress maintains a fairly consistent and constant level of activity in discussing
constitutional issues. Congressional engagement with the Constitution is not an
exceptional and rare event, but rather is a routine feature of legislative business and
politics. While dramatic high points of presidential impeachments or constitutional
amendments grab our attention, such episodes occur against a background of more
workmanlike and routine discussion of the goals and constraints of constitutional
government. As this chapter will demonstrate, the number of constitutionally oriented hearings is not significantly affected by whether Democrats or Republicans
control Congress or whether the White House and Congress are controlled by the
same party. Likewise, external factors (the president's policy agenda, Supreme Court
decision making) do not meaningfully influence congressional hearing activity on
constitutional issues. The two parties have held hearings focused on somewhat
different constitutional issues, however, and the Nixon Administration did provoke an unusual number of hearings called to respond to executive actions. In
other words, constitutionally oriented hearings are largely driven by the general
legislative calendar and reflect tendencies common to other hearings in Congress.
Congressional committees, like courts, regularly encounter the Constitution
in the course of carrying out their normal responsibilities. Over time, however,
the Judiciary Committees have come to dominate congressional consideration of
constitutional issues. While other committees hold fewer and fewer hearings On
constitutionally related issues, the Judiciary Committees continue to hold roughly
the same number of constitutionally oriented hearings.'' The continuing interest of
the Judiciary Committees in constitutional issues is tied to the committee's mission
and the interests of members who serve on these committees. The decline in the
number of hearings held outside of the Judiciary Committees is harder to explain.
Possible explanations include the ideological polarization in Congress, the increas ing emphasis on constituent service by members, and the rise of position-taking
legislation.
DATA AND APPROACH
The fact that committee hearings are generally public makes them a relatively
accessible source of information about Congress. The fact that they are largel y
stage-managed raises questions about how that information can be leveraged so
4

As discussed below, the mid-1990s is an exception to this general pattern.
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as to gain a useful perspective on the reality of congressional deliberation and lawmaking. Political scientists have used witness appearances at hearings to provide
insight into the relationship between Congress and interest groups, and the content of the discussions at legislative hearings has provided a wealth of information
about what issues and people legislators takes seriously. The presence or absence
of hearings on a given subject and their location within Congress can also provide
useful information on change in the public agenda and jurisdictional control over
issue areas.
For this chapter, we collected data from committee hearings in the U.S. House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate from January 1, 1971, through December 31, 2000.
The Congressional Information Service (CIS) publishes an abstract and witness list
for public hearings held by the committees and subcommittees of Congress. CIS
also assigns multiple topic keywords to each hearing. Using an online version of the
CIS database accessible through LexisNexis, we searched for every congressional
hearing between 1971 and 2000 containing a variation on the word "constitutional"
anywhere in the CIS entry, including the abstract, keywords, hearing title, or witness
identifiers. We then examined each entry in order to exclude those that did not
make substantive reference to the U.S. Constitution, such as hearings discussing
the constitution of Russia or including constitutional law professors testifying on
the assets of Holocaust victims. This left a data set of 1,152 congressional hearings.
We then recorded subject matter, date, congressional session, committee, whether
the hearing focused centrally on the constitutional issues it raised, and whether
the hearing was responding to executive or judicial actions.
Our data set is undoubtedly underinclusive of the entire set of hearings that
raised constitutional issues during the period. Hearing abstracts and keywords
only capture issues that formed a substantial part of the witness testimony. Consequently, this search procedure leaves out hearings that included only relatively
brief mentions of constitutional issues. This procedure is also dependent on CIS
coding of hearings, and it is possible that some types of constitutional issues and
discussions would not be reflected in the CIS entries. Moreover, CIS employs a number of keywords that are relevant to constitutionalism. Although such a procedure
would pick up a central CIS keyword ("constitutional law"), it would not necessarily
locate others (e.g., "civil liberties"). Nonetheless, there is substantial overlap in the
CIS coding (e.g., hearings with the keyword "civil liberties" are often also given the
keyword "constitutional law"), and many additional hearings were included based
not on the keyword but on terms elsewhere in the CIS entry. In sum, these 1,152
hearings are a sample of the total universe of hearings raising constitutional issues
during the period, but it is a sample that is likely to capture a large proportion of the
relevant universe and that is broadly representative of the types of constitutional
issues that come before Congress.
The data set as a whole includes 1,152 hearings, with 610 in the House, 528
in the Senate, and 14 in joint committees. The House held an average of twenty
hearings per year, and the Senate held an average of eighteen per year. Half of all
' For a review of the literature making use of congressional hearings, see Keith ti. Whittington, "Hearing
about the Constitution in Congressional Committees" in Neal Devins and Keith C. Whittington, eds.,
Congress and the Constitution (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005) at 87-109.
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Rights and Liberties, 51%

Civil Rights, 11%
Separation of
Power, 16%

Due Process, 11%
Free Speech, 10%

Federalism, 8%
Confirmation, 2%
Amendment, 10%

Liberties, 9%
Property Rights, 5%
controlious Liberty, 3%
Voting Rights, 2%

Figure 19.1. Subject Matter of Constitutional Hearings, 1971-2000.

the hearings in the sample addressed rights and liberties. The next most common
subject of such hearings was the separation of powers at 16 percent, followed by
issues of constitutional structure at 13 percent and constitutional amendment at
10 percent (see Figure 19.1).
Our data set allows us to examine how congressional committee hearings
addressing constitutional issues are distributed across time, across the legislature,
and across particular issue areas. We have three sorts of expectations as to how
congressional attention to constitutional issues might be structured: those shaped
by political parties, those shaped by internal institutions, and those shaped by
external institutions.
We might expect the incidence of such hearings to respond to partisan pressures
within Congress. The scheduling of committee hearings is a monopoly power held
by the majority party in the congressional chamber, and so we might expect partisan
factors to play a heavy role in determining whether constitutionally relevant hearings are scheduled. We consider three such possibilities. First, one party might be
more prone to holding constitutionally oriented hearings than the other. We might
imagine, for example, that one party has a greater ideological commitment to constitutionalism or includes more constituencies interested in constitutional issues
than does the other party. The Republican Party, for example, is often identified
with the "conservative social agenda." Party leaders have sought to countermand
the Supreme Court for rulings on abortion, school busing, religion in the public schools, and gay rights. House Republicans have also championed numerous
structural reforms as part of their Contract with America, including term limits, the
item veto, and unfunded mandates.' On the other hand, it is a common perception that the Democratic Party is the more civil libertarian party, reflected in items
ranging from 1988 Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis's proud
affirmation that he was a "card-carrying" member of the American Civil Liberties
Union to the party's celebration of "activist" judicial decisions such as Roe v. Wade.'
If true, we might expect the two chambers of Congress to hold more hearings raising
In 1994, Republicans successfully sought majority comrol of the [louse by running on the so-called
Contract with America. The Contract pledged a smaller federal government and a larger role for the
7

states.
410 11.S. 113 (1973).
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constitutional issues when they are held by the Democratic Party than when they
are held by the Republican Party.
Second, constitutionally oriented hearings may spike when there is a turnover
in partisan control of a chamber of Congress, but the number of such hearings
may decay over subsequent sessions as a single party retains control of the chamber and the legislative agenda. We might imagine, for example, that both parties
have constitutionally oriented agendas, but that the in-party monopolizes the legislative agenda and the control of committee hearings, frustrating the ability of
the out-party to publicize its own agenda items. As a consequence, when partisan control turns over, a burst of legislative activity may result as a new set of
policies and hearings become politically feasible. Once this pent-up demand for
legislative hearings has been met, however, there may be a declining need to hold
additional hearings over time as long as the same party continues to control the
agenda.
'Third, partisan polarization within Congress might affect the number of constitutionally oriented hearings. Ideological polarization might result in members
placing more emphasis on validating their policy priorities than on exploring
the constitutional soundness of their handiwork. As such, the growing ideological divide that separates the two parties might result in a decline in the number of constitutionally oriented hearings. Alternatively, by expanding the "gridlock
interval," the range of status quo policies that cannot be displaced by an existing
legislative majority, ideological polarization may reduce legislative productivity.
Increased hearing activity on politically symbolic issues may compensate politically for the decreased legislative output, or the environment of heightened ideological conflict may encourage additional hearings on contested constitutional
terrain."
We might expect the incidence of such hearings to respond to internal institutional features of Congress. First, the general legislative and electoral calendar
affects the pace and timing of hearings. Legislators may hold more constitutionally
oriented hearings in even-numbered (i.e., election) years as they generate issues
and a public record as they enter the campaign season. Alternatively, legislators may
decrease hearing activity in even-numbered years as campaigns put pressure on
the calendar and the legislative session winds to a close. Second, we would expect
the House to hold more such hearings than the Senate. Because the full House
faces reelection every other year, there may be more pressure on House members
to hold hearings to highlight issues of public concern. Moreover, the greater size
of the House may simply enable it to be more active in holding hearings without
putting undue pressure on individual members. Third, if constitutional issues are
routinely encountered as part of normal legislative business, we would expect the
number of hearings involving constitutional issues to be a function of the number of hearings held generally in Congress. Fourth, we might expect committee
expertise to affect the distribution of hearings touching on constitutional issues.
Committees with established expertise and interest in constitutional issues should
be disproportionately likely to schedule hearings addressing constitutional subject
Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Benjamin Ginsberg and
Martin Shelter, Politics by Other Means (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
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matter and more likely to recognize and hear testimony on constitutional issues
that might be relevant to a given policy debate.
Finally, we might expect the incidence of such hearings to respond to changes in
the external environment of Congress. Bruce Ackerman has suggested that politicians may turn to constitutional deliberation out of frustration and in an effort
to overcome some institutional obstacle to the realization of their policy preferences. Two features of the external environment are particularly notable in this
regard. First, the judiciary might push Congress into deliberating on constitutional
issues. Left to their own devices, legislators may be content to ignore the Constitution and focus on more bread-and-butter issues in American politics. Increased
judicial activity — most notably, the nullification of statutes by federal courts on
constitutional grounds — may force legislators to turn their collective attention to
constitutional matters and force increased constitutional deliberation. It has been
cogently argued, for instance, that Congress has only deliberated on the scope of
federal powers when the Supreme Court has aggressively enforced the boundaries
of federalism." This might be the case generally, and if so we might expect to see
increased hearing activity in response to increased levels of judicial invalidation of
statutes. Second, conflict with the executive branch may lead Congress into deliberating on constitutional meaning. During periods of divided partisan control of
the government, Congress may be more likely to hold hearings exploring the limits
of executive power or the scope of congressional power under the Constitution. The
impeachment of Democratic President Bill Clinton and the later investigation of
his use of the pardon power by the Republican-controlled Congress may illustrate a
broader tendency of institutionally based partisan warfare to lead to constitutional
challenges and argumentation.
PARTISAN FACTORS

first consider the three expectations based on partisan considerations regarding the incidence of such hearings. We find limited support for any of the three
party-based hypotheses.) The first such hypothesis was that the number of hearings held in a legislative chamber would vary depending on which party controlled
that chamber. It does not. In the thirty years between 1971 and 2000, the Democratic Party controlled the House for twenty-four years and the Senate for eighteen
years. The Democratic Senate held an average of nineteen hearings per year; the
Republican Senate held an average of sixteen hearings per year. The Democratic
House held twenty hearings per year; the Republican House held twenty-two. The
number of hearings held in Democratic-controlled years is not statistically distinguishable from the number of hearings held in Republican-controlled years.
Although the two parties may have had somewhat different substantive commitments when it comes to constitutional issues, one party was not noticeably more
likely to sponsor hearings raising constitutional issues than was the other. With this
We

I°

Frank B. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Polities ((;hicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993).
Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
J. Mitchell Pickerill, constitutional Deliberation in Congress (Durham, N.C.: Duke university Press,
2004).
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data, we cannot rule out the possibility that one party is uniformly more likely tp
raise constitutional issues but is able to raise those issues in hearings even when i t
isnamorty(becuhinpartysgedhiocalwtnse
hearings), but we do not believe this to be the case given the subject matter of the
hearings held under each party.
If we break down the hearings held by each party by subject matter, some
partisan differences do emerge, however. When in Republican hands, Congress
held approximately five additional hearings to discuss possible amendments to
the Constitution (all results significant at the .05 level). Although it is somewhat
ironic that the more conservative political party would give more attention to
constitutional reform than would the more liberal party, a variety of constitutional amendment proposals have been a prominent part of Republican politics over the past two decades, including amendments relating to such items as
alablncedugt,friandcogesltrmi.Conu
hearings addressing matters of federalism were also far more strongly associated
with Congress under Republican control than under Democratic control, which
is in keeping with the rhetoric of Republican presidents and party platforms during this period as well.12 When in Democratic hands, Congress spent more tim e
discungeparto-fwsquinadcot lrghsnibeties. Congress held approximately five more hearings involving the separation of
powers when Democrats were in the majority, a record that received a substantial boost from Nixon-era conflicts and their aftermath. A Democratic Congres s
heldaproximtysvndalherigtoucn sialrght
and liberties compared with a Republican Congress. While most areas of constitutional rights and liberties drew the attention of both parties, Democrats scheduled far more hearings addressing due process and voting rights issues than did
Republicans.
Our second party-based hypothesis suggested that hearings raising constitutional issues spiked when party control of a congressional chamber turned over.
Congressional chambers changed hands four times during these three decades:
in the Senate in 1981, 1987, and 1995, and in the House in 1995. We can compare
the congressional sessions controlled by a new party with those controlled by a
previously incumbent party. The average number of hearings held in the Senate in
sessions controlled by a new party is statistically indistinguishable from the number held in incumbent-controlled sessions. At thirty-seven, the number of hearings
held by the newly Republican Flouse in the 104th Congress was significantly above
the norm for the House during this period. Although turnover in party control
does not appear normally to lead to more constitutionally oriented hearings, the
"Gingrich Revolution" in the House following the 1994 elections was noticeably different in this regard. This deviation is not at all surprising. By running on a "Contract
with America" that included the line-item veto, term limits, and federalism initiatives, House Republicans made constitutional reform a centerpiece of the 104th
Congress.
Our final party-based hypothesis suggested that hearings raising constitutional
issues would vary with the ideological polarization of Congress. To examine this
12 I. Mitchell l'ickerill and Cornell W. Clayton, "The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism" (2001), 2:2 Perspectives on Politics 33.
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hypothesis, we turned to the difference in absolute party medians in each chamber
as measured by DW-NOMINATE scores. NOMINATE scores are a now-standard
measure of the location of legislators in ideological space (ranging from 1.000 to
—1.000) based on their overall voting behavior, and the difference in absolute party
medians captures the degree of party polarization in any given session as reflected
in voting behavior on roll-call votes.1 3 There is no statistically significant correlation between the degree of party polarization in a congressional chamber and the
number of hearings involving constitutional issues.
INTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
We considered four expectations regarding the incidence of constitutionally oriented hearings and the internal institutional features of Congress. First, we expected
that there would be variation across the legislative calendar of a two-year congressional session. There is indeed a robust relationship (at the .05 level) between
the calendar and the number of hearings, with Congress holding an average of
forty-seven hearings in odd-numbered years and thirty hearings in even-numbered
years. Pending elections tend to crowd hearings off the legislative calendar, including those hearings that raise constitutional issues (see Figure 19.2).
We expected that the more populous and electorally pressured House would
hold more hearings than the Senate. The House does hold a slight edge in the
number of hearings raising constitutional issues, averaging twenty such hearings
per year compared with the Senate's seventeen. This result is driven by the larger
overall number of hearings held by the House, however. The number of hearings
that raise constitutional issues in the Senate makes up a slightly higher percentage
of that chamber's overall number of hearings than does that in the House. Hearings raising constitutional issues constituted 2.6 percent of the hearings held in the
Senate during this period, but only 1.9 percent of those held in the House of Representatives. That percentage has also been much more stable in the Senate over
these three decades than in the House. In the Senate, the number of hearings that
raise constitutional issues is in part a function of the total number of hearings held
(at the .05 level). Although the number of hearings raising constitutional issues in
the Senate declined somewhat over this three-decade period, that decline tracks the
reduced number of hearings held overall in the Senate. In the House, however, the
number of constitutionally oriented hearings is independent of the total number
of hearings held each year. The percentage of House hearings raising constitutional
issues declined from a high in the early 1970s of over 4 percent to a low of under
1 percent in the mid-1980s before recovering somewhat in the late 1990s to levels
that were comparable to the mid-1970s. Even as the House held more hearings
overall in the late 1970s and 1980s, it held fewer addressing constitutional issues.
The House began to hold more constitutionally oriented hearings in the 1990s,
however, returning to the levels of the mid-1970s, even as the overall number of
hearings declined.
Much of the upswing in House hearings, as already noted, is tied to the 1994
Republican takeover of Congress and, with it, the Contract with America's embrace
of numerous constitutional reforms. In particular, the percentage of constitutional
" Keith T Poole and I loward Rosenthal, Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Figure 19.2. Hearings with Constitutional Discussions in U.S. House of Representatives and
Senate, 1971-2000.

hearings from 1994 to 1997 matched the 1973 to 1977 period. More telling, by
refomingthc syeminthHou,"GgrcRevltionshfd
power away from the standing committees and toward majority party leadership."
During the mid-1990s, House leaders pursued constitutionally oriented reforms
while reining in the committees. During the 1980s, however, committee chairs were
" See Steven S. Smith and Eric D. Lawrence, "Party Control of Committees in the Republican Congress"
in Lawrence ( Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, 6th ed.(Washington, DC:
CO Press, 1997) 16:I-92.
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more autonomous and House leadership was less interested in advancing a constitutional agenda. In other words, the power of House leadership to exert control
over committee priorities helps explain swings in the number of constitutionally
oriented hearings held in the House.
Unlike the House, Senate leadership exerts less influence over the legislative process and work product. The fact that the percentage of constitutionally oriented
hearings in the Senate has been much more stable than in the House reflects institutional differences in the two bodies. Majority leadership lacks the tools to push
through a party-driven agenda. Relatedly, the need to build supermajority coalitions results in a lawmaking process that is more deliberate, more decentralized,
and more accommodating to the preferences of individual Senators.'
THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES

Committee expertise is clearly an important factor in determining whether that
committee will hold hearings addressing constitutional issues. In each chamber,
the Judiciary Committee dominates constitutional discussions, even though constitutional issues are occasionally raised in the hearings of most committees." For
the period as a whole, the House Judiciary Committee sponsored 43 percent of
the hearings in the sample from that chamber. The Senate Judiciary Committee
sponsored 55 percent. In both chambers, however, the Judiciary Committee has
become more important as a site of constitutional discussion over the course of
these three decades. From an average of 33 percent of the hearings in the first two
Congresses in the sample, the House Judiciary Committee held an average of 66
percent in the last two Congresses. The story is not quite so dramatic in the Senate,
but mostly because the Senate Judiciary Committee started at a much higher level.
It held 46 percent of the hearings in the first two Congresses of the sample, but 62
percent in the last two Congresses (see Figure 19.3).
The Judiciary Committees did not become more active in holding such hearings;
other committees became lessactive in deliberating on the Constitution. This partly
reflects a fall-off from the widespread, although sporadic, consideration of constitutional issues in a large number of committees in the 1970s. But it also reflects the
shrinking role of more regular participants in the constitutional dialogue. Committees such as the Government Affairs and Labor that once held multiple hearings
raising constitutional issues every year averaged closer to one per year in the 19905.
Over the course of these three decades, the engagement with constitutional issues
became a more specialized endeavor within Congress. At the same time, committees such as Foreign Relations and Education and Labor that once could plausibly
claim to have an expertise of their own in addressing constitutional concerns as
I' See ibid. (explaining why the Senate did not pursue structural reforms during the 104th Congress and,
in so doing, distinguishing the two bodies); Barbara Sinclair, "Party Leaders and the New Legislative
Process" in Congress Reconsidered, 229-45.
II' The Judiciary Committees have jurisdiction over matters relating to the administration of justice in
federal courts, administrative bodies, and law enforcement agencies. The committees also play an
important role in impeachment proceedings. Through hearings and a committee vote, the Senate
Judiciary Committee screens Federal court nominees, including Supreme Court Justices. for additional
discussion, see infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.

a result of their steady engagement with them, have largely ceded jurisdiction to
the Judiciary Committees. Subject-specific concerns might still lead a committee
into consideration of a constitutional topic to which they might bring substantive
expertise or strong constituency interest, as when the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs turned its attention to religious liberty issues after the Supreme Court's 1990
Smith' decision or the House Energy and Commerce Committee contemplated
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 ll.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme
Court upheld Oregon's power to deny unemployment benefits to drug counselors who lost their jobs
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employedrug testing and tobacco advertising regulation in the mid-1980s, but
such encounters are now likely to be fleeting.
Differences between the Judiciary Committees and other committees are to
be expected. Judiciary Committee members are overwhelmingly policy-oriented
lawyers. They are comfortable with, even relish, legalistic arguments. Also, because
the Judiciary Committees often deal with highly divisive social issues (abortion, affirmative action, gun control), lawmakers who seek out these committees tend to be "true believers," individuals who do not feel the heat for taking
a stand on contentious constitutional questions." Moreover, Judiciary Committee members value a good legal argument, employ a "lawyer-like culture and
deliberative style," and care a great deal about whether the Supreme Court will
uphold their handiwork.' Given the skills, interests, and norms of the Judiciary
Committees, it is hardly surprising that these committees regularly deliberate
about constitutional matters. Relatedly, because Judiciary Committee members
are genuinely interested in holding hearings on constitutional questions, the
number of constitutional hearings held by the Judiciary Committees is fairly stable. Sometimes these hearings are extremely consequential (the confirmation of
Supreme Court nominees, the impeachment of Presidents Nixon and Clinton) and
other times they are largely symbolic; the overall number of hearings, however,
seems more a function of staffing issues than of the saliency of issues before the
Committee.
The steady decline in the number of constitutional hearings by other commit tees is harder to explain. What follows are some plausible explanations, although it
is unclear how much impact, if any, these explanations have had in affecting committee practices. First, for some committees, the decline may be tied to changing
norms. For example, Congress has ceded more and more of its war powers to the
president during the past thirty years.' The drop in constitutional hearings by
the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees may reflect
the changing balance of power between Congress and the president. Second, the
decline may also be tied to a relative diminution in the importance of constitutional
issues to the national policy agenda. In the early to mid-1970s, Watergate and civil
rights were dominant issues. Likewise, when Republicans took over the House in
1994, the Contract with America promised numerous constitutional reforms. A
third (and related) explanation for the decline is that today's lawmakers are not
especially interested in defending Congress's turf as an independent interpreter of
the Constitution. Through expedited Supreme Court review provisions, lawmakers
because they had used peyote as part of a Native American Church religious ceremony. In response to
this decision, Congress enacted legislation legalizing "the use, possession, or transportation ol peyote
of an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes." 108 Stat. 31 9 5 (1994). Congress also enacted
legislation providing broader protections of religious liberty, legislation invalidated by the Supreme
Court in City of Boerne v. Pores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
18
Christopher I. Deering and Steven S. Smith, Committees in Congress, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Cf.)
PressCQ97); Mark C. Miller, "Congressional Committees and the Federal Courts": A Neo-Institutionalist
Perspective" (1992) 45 Western Political Quarterly 949. For this very reason, most lawmakers do not
want to serve on an ideologically polarized committee that deals with "no win" issues. Deering and
Smith at 82.
1 ,1
Miller supra note 18 at 961; Roger H. Davidson, "The Lawmaking Congress" (Autumn 1993) 56 Intl
and Contemporary Problems 99.
zu Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication in War and Spending (College Station: Texas A&M University
Press, 20011.
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sometimes delegate their power of constitutional review to the courts." More
telling, a recent survey of members of the 106th Congress (1999-2001) reveals that
71 percent of lawmakers adhere to a "joint constitutionalist" perspective whereby
courts should give either "limited" or "no weight" to congressional assessments of
the constitutionality of legislation. 22 Another related explanation for the decline in
constitutionally oriented hearings is the ever-growing ideological polarization in
Congress. More than ever before, lawmakers may have hard-and-fast views about
the rightness of their policy agenda. The question of whether their policy agenda is
constitutional may matter less to today's lawmakers. Correspondingly, Democratic
and Republican leadership is increasingly is concerned with "message politics,"
that is, using the legislative process to make a symbolic statement to voters and
other constituents. By focusing its efforts on the message its party is sending, lawmakers places less emphasis on whether a federal court will uphold legislation
after it is enacted.23 Likewise, through the growing use of position-taking legislation, today's lawmakers place greater emphasis on "making pleasing judgmental
statements" than on making "pleasing things happen."'

EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

Two external institutional factors seem likely to affect the amount of constitutional
deliberation that occurs in Congress: the constitutional activism of the judiciary
and the partisan control of the presidency. In the aggregate, the number of hearings raising constitutional issues has little correlation with how active the Supreme
Court might he in striking clown federal or state legislation. Even the unprecedented
levels of judicial nullification of congressional legislation in the late 1990s had little
effect on the number of constitutionally oriented hearings scheduled in Congress.
Even in the specific area where the Rehnquist Court's activism has been posited
to increase congressional constitutional deliberation — federalism — Congress held
nearly as many hearings in the 1970s as in the 1990s, and the hearings that it did
hold in the 1990s were more associated with the newly empowered Republicans'
celebration of federalism in 1995 than with the Supreme Court.' Throughout the
period Congress scheduled hearings specifically to respond to particular judicial
actions, but these were just over 10 percent of the total and displayed no particular pattern. If heightened judicial scrutiny of federal legislation spurs greater
congressional attention to constitutional issues, it does not make itself evident in
the number or subject matter of congressional hearings.
21
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This is not to say that courts play no role in setting the constitutional agenda
as it appears in congressional hearings. The federalism decisions did not prompt
a legislative response because they did not prevent lawmakers and interest groups
from pursuing their policy agenda. The Court, while limiting Congress's power, had
not sought a return to Lochner-era restrictions. Far from hampering the current
Congress, the Court's federalism revival matched growing populist and lawmaker
distrust of Congress and reinforced the ideological inclinations of House and Senate
Republicans. 26 In contrast, were the Supreme Court to regularly undermine firstorder policy preferences, Court decision making could become a focal point of
the national political agenda. Absent something as stark as the Lochner era (where
Court hostility to the New Deal undermined first-order priorities),'' 7 however, the
constitutional agenda in Congress appears to be primarily set independently, by
Congress itself, rather than being driven by judicial decision making.
Congressional deliberation on constitutional issues in hearings is also largely
independent of the partisan control of the presidency. Throughout the period,
Congress scheduled hearings specifically to respond to particular executive actions,
but the number of such hearings dropped dramatically after the Nixon era and averaged only 7 percent of the hearings in the sample after 1974. Although the Nixon
Administration provoked more such hearings (significant at the .05 level), divided
government as such did not increase the number of hearings held to respond to
particular executive actions or to address separation-of-powers questions generally. Divided government also did not affect the total number of hearings touching
on constitutional issues. During the Reagan era, for example, Congress held fewer
hearings than any other time in this study. It did not matter that Reagan explicitly
campaigned against judicial activism, supported constitutional amendments on
abortion and school prayer, opposed school busing, nominated Robert Bork and
other conservatives to fill judicial vacancies, and much more. Congress, although
taking the note of the "Reagan Revolution" in all sorts of ways, did not step up its
hearings on constitutional issues in response to Reagan's efforts to reshape consti tutional law.
CONCLUSION

There is more routine discussion of constitutional issues in congressional commit tee hearings than would have been expected given the state of the scholarly literature. Congressional scholars largely ignore the content of congressional hearings
and certainly ignore constitutional discourse in Congress. Constitutional scholars
are increasingly interested in extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, but they
have only just begun to explore congressional efforts to interpret the Constitution
and have not yet given sustained attention to the primary site of congressional
deliberation, the committees.
In fact, Congress regularly hears testimony in committee hearings on constitutional issues. Although such hearings form only a small part of the overall
See Keith E. Whittington, "Taking What They Give Us," supra note 24; Neal Devins, The Judicial
Safeguards of Federalism" (2004) 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1131.
27 But see Keith E. Whittington, "Congress Before the Lochner Court" (2005) 85 B. IL L. Rev. 85.
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congressional workload, they evidence a regularized mechanism for congressional
constitutional deliberation and provide a useful window into the nature and extent
of congressional engagement with constitutional issues. Congress engages a wide
range of constitutional subjects. A surprising proportion of that legislative attention during these three decades was aimed at proposals to amend the Constitution, surprising given that no amendments were sent by Congress to the states
for ratification during this period. Congress also gives regular consideration to the
framework features of the constitutional system: federalism, separation of powers,
and structural matters. The majority of its hearings, however, concerned matters of
rights and liberties, although this broad category included a variety of more discrete
issues.
Perhaps the most basic driving force behind congressional hearing activity
involving the Constitution has been the internal demands of the legislature itself. In
the Senate at least, hearings relating to constitutional issues are a partly a function of
overall hearing activity. The legislative calendar imposes a rhythm on the hearing
schedule, with most committee activity occurring in the year following an election. The Judiciary Committees have dominated congressional discussion of the
Constitution throughout the last three decades of the twentieth century, but that
dominance has become more pronounced in recent years as fewer committees
engage in constitutional discussion and those that still do so less often. Unlike the
Judiciary Committees, the power and prestige of other committees is not at all tied
to their constitutional deliberations. For a variety of reasons, these committees
have less and less reason to examine constitutional questions independently. Consequently, in comparison even to the 1970s, Congress is now far more dependent
on the specialized expertise and interest of the Judiciary Committees to identify
and vet constitutional issues.
In important ways, Congress appears to set its own constitutional agenda. Judicial activity factors into congressional discussions, but constitutional deliberation
in committees does not require or follow obvious judicial spurs. Likewise, divided
government exercised a surprisingly small force on congressional hearing activity. Although neither political party appears more inclined to consider constitutional issues in Congress, the two parties do differ somewhat in the types of issues
that they have tended to raise for discussion. Whereas Republican majorities have
tended to schedule hearings to consider proposals for constitutional reform, Democratic majorities have been more inclined to discuss separation-of-power issues
and rights and liberties.

